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Can a phenomenological description delineate aspects of 
religious experience accidently—or at least without referring to 
religion or God? In this book, Sonya Sikka finds such an experience 
implicit in the descriptions of Dasein's experience of being in the 
work of Martin Heidegger. To test this claim, Sikka holds 
Heidegger's thought up against the descriptions of religious 
experience from four fourteenth century mystics presenting a series 
of comparisons involving Heidegger's thought of being and the 
thought of being God in St Bonaventure, Meister Eckhart, Johannes 
Tauler and Jan van Ruusbroec. In regard to Heidegger, the book 
suggests that however forcefully Heidegger 's cri t ique of 
ontotheology and traditional metaphysics may implicate 
rationalistic theology, central aspects of his program bear striking 
resemblance to medieval mystical theology. 
Sikka first compares Heidegger with St. Bonaventure who, she 
claims, "stands squarely within the metaphysical tradition" (5) but 
whose thought nonetheless bears resemblance to that of Heidegger. 
Whereas Heidegger's critique of traditional metaphysics takes aim 
at thinking being in the form of functions of speculative reason, it 
is—more than anything else—the mystical experience grounding 
the expression of St. Bonaventure and the other medievals dealt 
with that, Sikka argues, bears resemblance to (or perhaps identity 
with) the experience behind Heidegger's positive descriptions (5). 
This comparison marks a broad engagement with the thought 
of Heidegger in relation to St. Bonaventure's Itinerarium Mentis 
in Deum. Sikka follows the path of Bonaventure's Itinerary whereby 
the mind ascends in three stages to God, first, through seeing the 
order or ration in things in the world, second by turning inward to 
see in the mind itself the image of God, then ascending further to 
see the deity directly as being and as the good ultimately, beyond 
thought, as paradox in the Incarnation of God. Early in her 
interpretation of Bonaventure—and seeming to anticipate points 
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of comparison with Heidegger's thought—Sikka points out the 
important involvement of a decision to come to see objects in terms 
of the divine ratio. Without overlooking the importance of such a 
decision, we also note preparation for seeing objects in this also 
includes, according to Bona venture, beside decision "penetrating 
meditation, holy living, and devout prayer" (1.8) which is to say, a 
way of life. The engagement with Heidegger finds contrast with 
Bonaventure in terms of Heidegger's historically oriented revision 
of ratio or logos. Points of comparison include the role of decision 
and admiratio in Bonaventure to that of attunement and wonder in 
Heidegger. Sikka also finds that the insight of the enrootedness of 
thought in experience in both authors, though the fixity of the system 
of being in Bonaventure bears distinction from essential historicality 
in Heidegger. The discussion takes into account a broad range of 
Heidegger's work including What is Philosophy?, An Introduction 
to Metaphysics, What is Called Thinking, Basic Concepts, 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, and Being and Time. 
The second comparison of Heidegger with Meister Eckhart's 
Quaestiones Parisienses and his sermons yields even stronger 
commonalities. However, in this reviewers mind, this comparison 
brings to surface the most controversial and difficult thesis of the 
book: the thesis that Eckhart's expressions of the ineffable God 
and Heidegger's expressions of ungraspable being, in a certain 
sense, convey the same content. Sikka measures this claim against 
that of John Caputo who argues for a strong analogy between the 
thought of being in Heidegger and the though of the Godhead in 
Eckhart. The argument in Forms finds in these two descriptions 
not merely analogical sameness but a sameness of content. This 
claim is controversial insofar as it challenges the self-understanding 
Heidegger sets forth of his philosophy insofar where he explicitly 
denies any relation of his understanding of being to an understanding 
of God. Sikka cites this tension and carefully specifies that the 
sameness she attributes to these descriptions regards the nature of 
the experience described by both Heidegger and Eckhart. Whether 
in respect to being or to the mystical experience of God, she 
explains, both describe an experience that essentially decanters the 
subject. The question whether this aspect of the experience exhausts 
its meaning in the description of either writer remains open. 
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Nevertheless, Sikka presents a considerable challenge to the position 
Caputo defends regarding the relation of Heidegger to Eckhart. 
The discussion in this section exemplifies the book's on-going 
exploration, inspired by Scheler's concept of religious apprehension 
(8) found in On the Eternal In Man, of the possibility of grounding 
a contemporary philosophy of God on a sort of religious 
apprehension or experience. Throughout the book, Sikka draws 
out different aspects and possibilities of such an experience from 
all five writers. 
The following comparison presents the call of conscience in 
both a theological and non-theological sense, found in Johannes 
Tauler and Heidegger respectively. Again, Sikka argues for a degree 
of sameness in regard to the experience involved under either 
interpretation of the call. This comparison examines the question 
of conscience in the existential analysis of Being and Time against 
the call of God the Father in the work of Tauler. Because Heidegger, 
by framing his description in terms of fundamental ontology 
postpones theological interpretation, Sikka focuses in the 
experiential content in the descriptions of both writers to decipher 
their pertinence to a perspective philosophy of God. She finds that 
in both Tauler and Heidegger the person os called by a hidden, 
inner source from what she is to what she can become. The 
differences are not overlooked. For Tauler, the image of God is 
imprinted on the human soul. This inner image conveys the voice 
of God the father who lures the person toward union with God. In 
Heidegger's fundamental ontology, which characteristically 
suspends theological interpretation, the source on the call of 
conscience, though connected to Dasein, remains indeterminate. 
Past these differences, Sikka argues, there is a similarity of "real 
content" (201) between the two accounts of conscience. Though 
the call can be ignored or suppressed, both writers agree that a call 
springs from the essence of human being. Further, although 
Heidegger criticizes theological interpretations of the call as 
pressing an ontic explanation upon an ontoiogical phenomenon, 
Sikka argues Tauler evades this criticism insofar as God in calling 
remains, in a certain sense, hidden. Thus, she compares the 
hiddenness of God in Tauler to the indefinateness of the caller in 
Heidegger's existential analysis (204). In this manner Sikka steers 
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these two apparently divergent interpretations of conscience towards 
each other on the level of the experience they refer to , and she 
further suggests that both accounts involve at root "an intrinsic 
relation to the infinite" (201). 
The final comparison (Heidegger with Ruusbroec) expands on 
the theme of the mystical nature of an experience that decenters 
the subject. Sikka explicates Ruusbroec's description of ecstatic 
union with God in the rapture of love in comparison with 
Heidegger ' s discussion of "the turning" and the event of 
appropriation of being (ereignis). She points to similar discussions 
in each author of the modes of human action juxtaposed against a 
modeless source—though the names that allude to this source, she 
concedes, are pertinently distinguished as the love of God in 
Ruusbroec as opposed to the truth of being in Heidegger. In 
elaborating further the interplay of human effort and nonhuman 
gift in the descriptions of human experience of both writers Sikka 
defends a point of interpretation in regard to Being and Time that 
in that book being holds priority over Dasein and not the reverse. 
She finds the text ambiguous, and she supports her interpretative 
position by pointing to later works of Heidegger as clarifying the 
meaning of the earlier text. 
Along the course of the comparisons and analyses readers will 
find discussions of Heidegger's views on history and eschatology 
as well as a tempered critique of Heidegger on intersubjectivity. 
Further, Sikka's discussion of the event of appropriation of being 
(ereignis) in the last section provokes for this reviewer questions 
about the character of being for Heidegger where the discussion 
exposes person-like characteristics in Heidegger's description of 
being (179f.,263f.). 
In light of Heidegger's theological disclaimer (which Sikka 
recognizes), some may wish to critically engage Sikka's argument 
for the claim that there is a sense in which Heidegger may be 
considered a mystical theologian (265). Regardless of the position 
one may take, students and scholars of the philosophy of Heidegger. 
Medieval philosophy and the philosophy of religion will find herein 
insightful analyses and challenging explorations. Though Sikka 
situates her work in contemporary (and Prospective) philosophy 
of God, these comparisons and their guiding theme of the experience 
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of God just as well result in a considerable contribution to 
contemporary philosophy of religious experience. 
